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Abstract
In two-player zero-sum games, if both players minimize their average external
regret, then the average of the strategy profiles converges to a Nash equilib-
rium. For n-player general-sum games, however, theoretical guarantees for
regret minimization are less understood. Nonetheless, Counterfactual Regret
Minimization (CFR), a popular regret minimization algorithm for extensive-
form games, has generated winning three-player Texas Hold’em agents in
the Annual Computer Poker Competition (ACPC). In this paper, we pro-
vide the first set of theoretical properties for regret minimization algorithms
in non-zero-sum games by proving that solutions eliminate iterative strict
domination. We formally define dominated actions in extensive-form games,
show that CFR avoids iteratively strictly dominated actions and strategies,
and demonstrate that removing iteratively dominated actions is enough to
win a mock tournament in a small poker game. In addition, for two-player
non-zero-sum games, we bound the worst case performance and show that
in practice, regret minimization can yield strategies very close to equilib-
rium. Our theoretical advancements lead us to a new modification of CFR
for games with more than two players that is more efficient and may be used
to generate stronger strategies than previously possible. Furthermore, we
present a new three-player Texas Hold’em poker agent that was built using
CFR and a novel game decomposition method. Our new agent wins the
three-player events of the 2012 ACPC and defeats the winning three-player
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programs from previous competitions while requiring less resources to gen-
erate than the 2011 winner. Finally, we show that our CFR modification
computes a strategy of equal quality to our new agent in a quarter of the
time of standard CFR using half the memory.
Keywords: Counterfactual Regret Minimization, extensive-form games,
domination, computer poker, abstraction
2000 MSC: 68T37
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1. Introduction
Normal-form games are a common and general framework useful for mod-
elling problems involving single, simultaneous decisions made by multiple
agents. When decisions are sequential and involve imperfect information or
stochastic events, extensive-form games are generally more practical.
A common solution concept in games is a Nash equilibrium strategy pro-
file that guarantees no player can gain utility by unilaterally deviating from
the profile. For two-player zero-sum games, a Nash equilibrium is a powerful
notion. In such domains, every Nash equilibrium profile results in the players
earning their unique game value, and playing a strategy belonging to a Nash
equilibrium guarantees a payoff no worse than the game value. In n-player
general-sum games, these strong guarantees are lost. Each Nash equilibrium
may provide different payoffs to the players and no guarantee can be made
when more than one player deviates from a specific equilibrium profile. Re-
gardless, no practical algorithms are known for computing an equilibrium in
even moderately-sized games with more than two players.
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) [1] is a state-of-the-art al-
gorithm for approximating Nash equilbria of large two-player zero-sum
extensive-form games. CFR is an iterative, off-line regret minimizer that
stores two strategy profiles, the current profile that is being played at the
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present iteration, and the average profile that accumulates a running average
of all previous profiles generated. In two-player zero-sum games, the average
profile approaches a Nash equilibrium and is generally used in practice, while
the current profile is discarded. CFR can also be applied to non-zero-sum
games and games with more than two players, but the average profile does
not necessarily approximate an equilibrium in such cases [2, Table 2]. Previ-
ous work provides no theoretical insights into the average profile outside of
two-player zero-sum games.
Nonetheless, CFR has been applied successfully to games that are not
two-player zero-sum. For example, CFR was used to generate more aggres-
sive, or tilted, poker strategies from non-zero-sum games capable of defeating
top poker professionals in two-player limit Texas Hold’em [3]. In addition,
winning three-player Texas Hold’em poker strategies in the Annual Computer
Poker Competition (ACPC) [4] have been constructed using CFR [2, 5]. As
CFR’s memory requirements are linear in the size of the game, a common ap-
proach in poker is to employ a state-space abstraction that merges different
card deals into buckets, leaving hands in the same bucket indistinguishable
[6, 7]. Three-player limit Texas Hold’em contains over 1017 decision states,
and so many hands must be merged for CFR to be feasible. In 2011, the
winning three-player agent combated this problem through heads-up expert
strategies [2] that merged fewer hands and only acted in common two-player
scenarios resulting from one player folding early in a hand. While CFR has
been successful in these games, a reason why CFR might be successful in
such domains has not been given.
In this paper, we provide the first theoretical groundings for regret min-
imization algorithms applied to games that are not two-player zero-sum.
This is achieved by establishing elimination of iteratively dominated errors:
mistakes where there exists an alternative that is guaranteed to do better,
assuming the opponents do not make such errors themselves. The contri-
butions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, we prove that in normal-form
games, common regret minimization techniques eliminate (play with proba-
bility zero) iteratively strictly dominated strategies. Secondly, we formally
define dominated actions and prove that under certain conditions, CFR elim-
inates iteratively strictly dominated actions and strategies. Thirdly, for two-
player non-zero-sum games, we bound the average profile’s worst-case per-
formance, providing a theoretical understanding of tilted poker strategies.
Fourthly, our theoretical results lead us to a simple modification of CFR for
games with more than two players that only uses the current profile and does
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not average. We demonstrate that with this change, CFR generates poker
strategies that perform just as well as those generated without the change,
but now require less time and less memory to compute. Furthermore, for
large games requiring state-space abstraction, this reduction in memory al-
lows finer-grained abstractions to be used by CFR, leading to even stronger
strategies than previously possible. Fifthly, we develop a new three-player
limit Texas Hold’em agent that, instead of using heads-up experts, varies
its abstraction quality according to the estimated importance of each state.
Our new agent wins the three-player events of the 2012 ACPC and defeats
the previous years’ champions, all while needing less computer memory to
generate than the 2011 winner.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers background
material in game theory and solution concepts relevant to our work. Next,
Section 3 discusses regret minimization and provides an overview of CFR in
extensive-form games. We then formally define dominated actions in Section
4 before proving our theoretical results in Section 5. Section 6 explores
these theoretical findings and insights empirically across a number of different
poker games. Our new champion three-player Texas Hold’em agent is then
described and evaluated in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes our work
and discusses future research directions. Proof sketches are provided with
the theorem statements, while full technical proofs are provided in Appendix
A.
2. Games
2.1. Normal and Extensive Forms
A finite normal-form game is a tuple G = 〈N,A, u〉 where N =
{1, ..., n} is the set of players, A = A1 × · · · × An is the set of action
profiles with Ai being the finite set of actions available to player i, and
ui : A → R is the utility function that denotes the payoff for player i at
each possible action profile. If n = 2 and u1 = −u2, the game is two-player
zero-sum (or simply zero-sum). Otherwise, the game is non-zero-sum.
Two-player normal-form games are often represented by a matrix with rows
denoting the row player’s actions, columns denoting the column player’s ac-
tions, and entries indicating utilities resulting from the row player’s and
column player’s actions respectively. A mixed strategy σi for player i is a
probability distribution over Ai, where σi(a) is the probability that action a
is taken under σi. The set of all such strategies for player i is denoted Σi.
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Define the support of σi, supp(σi), to be the set of actions assigned positive
probability by σi. A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a collection of strategies
σ = (σ1, ..., σn), one for each player. We let σ−i refer to the strategies in σ
excluding σi, and ui(σ) to be the expected utility for player i when players
play according to σ.
Extensive-form games are often preferred to normal form when multiple
decisions are made sequentially. Before providing the formal definitions, we
describe Kuhn Poker, an extensive-form game that we will use as a running
example throughout this paper. Kuhn Poker [8] is a zero-sum card game
played with a three-card deck containing a Jack, Queen, and King. Each
player antes one chip and is dealt one private card at random from the deck
that no other player can see. There is a single round of betting starting with
player 1, who may either check or bet one chip. If a bet is made, player 2
can either fold and forfeit the hand, or call the one chip bet. When faced
with a check, player 2 can either check or bet one chip, where a bet forces
player 1 to either fold or call the bet. If neither player folds after the round
of betting, then the player with the highest ranked card wins all of the chips
played.
In general, a finite extensive-form game with imperfect information
[9] is a tuple Γ = 〈N,A,H, P, σc, u, I〉 that contains a game tree with nodes
corresponding to histories of actions h ∈ H and edges corresponding to
actions a ∈ A(h) available to player P (h) ∈ N ∪{c} (where again N is the
set of players and c denotes chance). For histories h, h′ ∈ H, we call h a
prefix of history h′, written h v h′, if h′ begins with the sequence h. When
P (h) = c, σc(h, a) is the (fixed) probability of chance generating action a at
h. Terminal nodes correspond to terminal histories z ∈ Z ⊆ H that have
associated utilities ui(z) for each player i. We define ∆i = maxz,z′∈Z ui(z)−
ui(z
′) to be the range of utilities for player i. Non-terminal histories for player
i, Hi, are partitioned into information sets I ∈ Ii representing the different
game states that player i cannot distinguish between. For example, in Kuhn
Poker, player i does not see the private card dealt to the opponent, and thus
every pair of histories differing only in the private card of the opponent are
in the same information set for player i. For each I ∈ Ii, the action sets
A(h) must be identical for all h ∈ I, and we denote this set by A(I). Define
|A(Ii)| = maxI∈Ii |A(I)| to be the maximum number of actions available to
player i at any information set. We assume perfect recall that guarantees
players always remember information that was revealed to them, the order
it was revealed, and the actions they chose.
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A behavioral strategy for player i, σi ∈ Σi, is a function that maps
each information set I ∈ Ii to a probability distribution over A(I). Denote
piσ(h) as the probability of history h occurring if all players play according
to σ = (σ1, ..., σn). We can decompose pi
σ(h) =
∏
i∈N∪{c} pi
σ
i (h) into each
player’s and chance’s contribution to this probability. Here, piσi (h) is the
contribution to this probability from player i when playing according to σi.
Let piσ−i(h) be the product of all contributions (including chance) except that
of player i. In addition, let piσ(h, h′) be the probability of history h′ occurring
after h, given that h has occurred. Let piσi (h, h
′) and piσ−i(h, h
′) be defined
similarly. Furthermore, we define the probability of player i reaching infor-
mation set I ∈ Ii as piσi (I) = piσi (h) for any h ∈ I. This is well-defined due
to perfect recall as any two histories reaching the same information set must
have followed the same sequence of actions at previous, identical information
sets.
A strategy si is pure if a single action is assigned probability 1 at every
information set; for each I ∈ Ii, let si(I) be this action. Denote Si as the
set of all pure strategies for player i. For a behavioral strategy σi, define the
support of σi to be supp(σi) = {si ∈ Si | σi(I, si(I)) > 0 for all I ∈ Ii}.
Note that normal form is a generalization of extensive form. An extensive-
form game Γ can be represented in normal form G by setting the action
set in G for player i to be the set of all pure strategies in Γ and assigning
utility ui(s) =
∑
z∈Z pi
s(z)ui(z). Then, every behavioral strategy σi in Γ has
a utility-equivalent mixed strategy in G where the probability of selecting
si is
∏
I∈Ii σi(I, si(I)) [10]. However, normal form is often impractical for
even moderately-sized problems because the size of the action set in G is
exponential in |Ii| · |A(Ii)|.
2.2. Solution Concepts
In this paper, we consider the problem of computing a strategy profile
to a game for play against a set of unknown opponents. The most common
solution concept is the Nash equilibrium. For  ≥ 0, a strategy profile σ is
an -Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate from σ and
gain more than ; i.e., maxσ′i∈Σi ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) ≤ ui(σ) +  for all i ∈ N . A
0-Nash equilibrium is simply called a Nash equilibrium. For games with
more than two players, computing a Nash equilibrium is hard and belongs
to the PPAD-complete class of problems [11–14]. Alternatively, we consider
a superset of Nash equilibria, particularly those profiles that avoid iterative
strict domination.
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Definition 1. A strategy σi for player i is a strictly dominated strategy
if there exists another player i strategy σ′i such that ui(σi, σ−i) < ui(σ
′
i, σ−i)
for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i.
Weak and very weak dominance have also been studied that allow equality
instead of strict inequality for all but one and for all opponent profiles respec-
tively. For each type of dominance, an iteratively dominated strategy
is any strategy that is either dominated or becomes dominated after suc-
cessively removing iteratively dominated strategies from the game. In this
paper, we focus on strict domination where it is well-known that iterated
removal of strictly dominated strategies always results in the same set of
remaining strategies, regardless of the order of removal [15].
Conitzer and Sandholm [16] prove that a strictly dominated strategy σi ∈
Σi in a normal-form game can be identified in time polynomial in |Ai| = |Si|
by showing that the objective of the linear program
minimize
∑
si∈Si
psi (1)
subject to ∀s−i ∈ S−i,
∑
si∈Si
psiui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(σi, s−i)
is less than 1, where each psi is a nonnegative real number. Iteratively strictly
dominated strategies can then be eliminated by repeatedly solving this pro-
gram and removing the dominated pure strategies from Si and S−i. How-
ever, this method is infeasible for large extensive-form games as the linear
programs would require an exponential number of constraints in the size of
the game. Hansen et al. [17] develop a dynamic programming algorithm for
partially observable stochastic games, a generalization of normal-form games,
that removes iteratively very weakly dominated strategies, but is not prac-
tical beyond small toy problems. Further insights are provided by Waugh’s
domination value [18] that attempts to measure the amount of utility lost
through playing iteratively dominated strategies in zero-sum games. Waugh
demonstrates a strong correlation between the domination value of a strategy
with performance in a small poker game, suggesting that removal of domi-
nated strategies is enough for good play. This particular work motivates our
results in Section 5.
Two other generalizations of Nash equilibria, correlated and coarse cor-
related equilibria, require a mechanism for correlation among the players.
Suppose an independent moderator selects a profile σk from E = {σ1, ..., σK}
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
a b
A 1, 0 0, 0
B 0, 0 2, 0
C −1, 0 1, 0

Figure 1: A two-player non-zero-sum normal-form game, where the column player’s utility
is always zero.
according to distribution q and privately recommends each player i play strat-
egy σki . Then (E, q) is a correlated equilibrium if no player has an incen-
tive to unilaterally deviate from any recommendation. A coarse correlated
equilibrium is similar but even more general, where for all i ∈ N , we only
require that
K∑
k=1
q(k)ui(σ
k) ≥ max
σ′i∈Σi
K∑
k=1
q(k)ui(σ
′
i, σ
k
−i). (2)
To not be in a coarse correlated equilibrium, a player would need incentive
to deviate even before receiving a recommendation and the deviation must
be independent of the recommendation. Without a mechanism for correla-
tion, it is unclear how a practitioner should use a correlated equilibrium.
In addition, while correlated equilibria remove dominated strategies [19], a
coarse correlated equilibrium may lead to the recommendation of a strictly
dominated strategy. For example, in the normal-form game in Figure 1,
{(A, a) = 0.5, (B, b) = 0.25, (C, b) = 0.25} is a coarse correlated equilibrium
with the row player’s expected utility being 5/4, yet the strictly dominated
row player strategy that always plays C is recommended 25% of the time.
3. Regret Minimization
Given a sequence of strategy profiles σ1, ..., σT , the (external) regret
for player i is
RTi = max
σ′i∈Σi
T∑
t=1
(
ui(σ
′
i, σ
t
−i)− ui(σt)
)
.
RTi measures the amount of utility player i could have gained by following the
single best fixed strategy in hindsight at all time steps t = 1, ..., T . Theorem
1 below states a well-known result that relates regret to Nash equilibria in
zero-sum games:
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Theorem 1. In a zero-sum game, for  ≥ 0, if RTi ≤  for i = 1, 2, then the
average strategy profile, σ¯T (defined later), is a 2-Nash equilibrium.
A proof is provided by Waugh [18, p. 11]. It is also well-known that in
any game, minimizing internal regret, a stronger notion of regret, leads to a
correlated equilibrium, but we only consider external regret here.
3.1. Regret Matching and CFR
Regret matching [20] is a very simple, iterative procedure that mini-
mizes average regret in a normal-form game. First, the initial profile σ1 is
chosen arbitrarily. For each action a ∈ Ai, we store the accumulated regret
RTi (a) =
∑T
t=1
(
ui(a, σ
t
−i)− ui(σti , σt−i)
)
that measures how much player i
would rather have played a at each time step t than follow σti . Successive
strategies are then determined according to
σT+1i (a) =
RT,+i (a)∑
b∈Ai R
T,+
i (b)
, (3)
where x+ = max{x, 0} and actions are chosen arbitrarily when the denomi-
nator is zero. One can show that
RTi
T
= max
a∈Ai
RTi (a)
T
≤ ∆i
√|Ai|√
T
. (4)
A general proof is provided by Gordon [21], while a more direct proof is
provided by Lanctot [22, Theorem 2]. By Theorem 1, the average strategy
profile, defined by σ¯Ti (a) =
∑T
t=1 σ
t
i(a)/T , approaches a Nash equilibrium
as T →∞.
Regret matching requires storage of RTi (a) for all a ∈ Ai. Thus, it is in-
feasible to directly apply regret matching to even moderately-sized extensive-
form games due to the resulting exponential size of the action (pure strat-
egy) space. Alternatively, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)
[1] is a state-of-the-art algorithm that minimizes average regret while only
requiring storage proportional to |Ii| · |A(Ii)| in the extensive-form game.
Pseudocode is provided in Algorithm 1. On each iteration t and for each
player i, the expected utility for player i is computed at each information set
I ∈ Ii under the current profile σt, assuming player i plays to reach I. This
expectation is the counterfactual value for player i,
vi(I, σ) =
∑
z∈ZI
ui(z)pi
σ
−i(z[I])pi
σ(z[I], z),
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Algorithm 1 Counterfactual Regret Minimization (Zinkevich et al. 2008)
1: Initialize regret: ∀I, a ∈ A(I) : R(I, a)← 0
2: Initialize cumulative profile: ∀I, a ∈ A(I) : s(I, a)← 0
3: Initialize current profile: ∀I, a ∈ A(I) : σ(I, a) = 1/|A(I)|
4: for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T} do
5: for i ∈ N do
6: for I ∈ Ii do
7: σi(I, ·)← RegretMatching(R(I, ·))
8: for a ∈ A(I) do
9: R(I, a)← R(I, a) + vi(I, σ(I→a))− vi(I, σ)
10: s(I, a)← s(I, a) + piσi (I)σi(I, a)
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
14: end for
where ZI is the set of terminal histories passing through I and z[I] is the
history leading to z contained in I. For each action a ∈ A(I), these values
determine the counterfactual regret at iteration t, rti(I, a) = vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))−
vi(I, σ
t), where σ(I→a) is the profile σ except at I, action a is always taken.
The regret rti(I, a) measures how much player i would rather play action
a at I than follow σti at I. These regrets are accumulated to obtain the
cumulative counterfactual regret, RTi (I, a) =
∑T
t=1 r
t
i(I, a), that define
the current strategy profile via regret matching at I,
σT+1i (I, a) =
RT,+i (I, a)∑
b∈A(I) R
T,+
i (I, b)
. (5)
This procedure minimizes average regret according to the bound
RTi
T
≤ ∆i|Ii|
√|A(Ii)|√
T
[1, Theorem 4]. (6)
During computation, CFR stores a cumulative profile sTi (I, a) =∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (I)σ
t
i(I, a). Once CFR is terminated after T iterations, the out-
put is the average strategy profile σ¯Ti (I, a) = s
T
i (I, a)/
∑
b∈A(I) s
T
i (I, b).
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Since all players are minimizing average regret, it follows by Theorem 1
that for zero-sum games, CFR’s average profile converges to a Nash equi-
librium. For non-zero-sum games, if we assign probability 1/T to each of
the profiles {σ1, ..., σT} generated by CFR or any other regret minimizer,
then by equation (2) and minimization of regret, this converges to a coarse
correlated equilibrium. Though previous work omits this fact, it is unclear
how this could be useful, let alone why the average strategy σ¯Ti might be
valuable. However, the average strategy has been shown to perform well em-
pirically in non-zero-sum games against human opponents and competitors
in the ACPC [2, 3, 5]. One of our aims in this paper is to help explain why
CFR is performing well in non-zero-sum games.
3.2. Other Regret Minimization Concepts and Techniques
There are two other solution concepts associated with the notion of regret
minimization. Both concepts define the regret of a strategy σi to be
regreti(σi) = max
σ′i∈Σi
σ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σ
′
i, σ−i)− ui(σi, σ−i).
Firstly, Renou and Schlag [23] define σ∗ ∈ Σ as a minimax regret equilibrium
relative to Σ if
regreti(σ
∗
i ) ≤ regreti(σi) for all σi ∈ Σi and all i ∈ N.
This turns out to be an even stronger condition than Nash equilibrium, which
is already hard to compute in games with more than two players. The authors
also define the -minimax regret equilibrium variant where with probability
1 −  the opponents are assumed to play according to the equilibrium, and
with probability  no assumption is made. Here, the common assumption
of rationality is dropped and thus -minimax regret equilibria can end up
playing iteratively strictly dominated strategies [23, p. 276].
Secondly, Halpern and Pass [24] introduce iterated regret minimization.
Much like iterated removal of dominated strategies, the authors iteratively
remove all strategies σi that do not provide minimal regreti(σi). They show
that while the set of non-iteratively strictly dominated strategies can be
disjoint from those that survive iterated regret minimization, their solutions
match closely to those solutions played by real people in a number of small
games. Our work here is less concerned with understanding how humans
arrive at solutions and more concerned with understanding and advancing
CFR in developing state-of-the-art game-playing agents.
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4. Dominated Actions
Our contributions in this paper begin with a formal definition of domi-
nated actions that are specific to extensive-form games, and we relate such
actions to dominated strategies. Dominated actions are considered in the
Gambit Software Tools package and are loosely defined as actions that are
“always worse than another, regardless of the beliefs at the information set”
[25]. Here, we say an action a at I ∈ Ii is a strictly dominated action if
there exists a strategy σ′i that guarantees higher counterfactual value at I to
any other strategy σi that always plays a at I, regardless of what the oppo-
nents play but assuming they reach I with positive probability. The formal
definition is below.
Definition 2. An action a ∈ A(I) of an extensive-form game is a strictly
dominated action if there exists a strategy σ′i ∈ Σi such that for all profiles
σ ∈ Σ satisfying ∑h∈I piσ−i(h) > 0, we have vi(I, σ(I→a)) < vi(I, (σ′i, σ−i)).
We use the counterfactual value vi instead of ui in Definition 2 because we
are only concerned with the utility to player i from I onwards rather than
over the entire game. Similar to iteratively dominated strategies, we also
define an iteratively strictly dominated action as one that is either
strictly dominated or becomes strictly dominated after successively remov-
ing strictly dominated actions from the players’ action sets. Analogous to
strategic dominance in Definition 1, weak and very weak action dominance
allow equality rather than strict inequality for all but one profile σ and for
all profiles respectively. In addition, weak and very weak action dominance
do not require the condition that
∑
h∈I pi
σ
−i(h) > 0.
For example, consider again Kuhn Poker defined in Section 2. When
player 2 is faced with a bet from player 1, calling the bet when holding the
Jack is a strictly dominated action. This is because the Jack is the worst card
and thus never wins regardless of player 1’s private card. Similarly, folding
with the King is a strictly dominated action. Note that a strategy that plays
either of these actions with positive probability is not necessarily a strictly
dominated strategy (but is a weakly dominated strategy, as Hoehn et al. [26]
conclude) because there exist player 1 strategies that never bet. In addition,
once these two actions are removed, one can check that player 1’s action of
betting with the Queen is iteratively strictly dominated. Since player 2 now
only folds with the Jack and only calls with the King, it is strictly better for
player 1 to always check with the Queen and then call a player 2 bet with
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probability 2/3. Thus, iteratively strictly dominated actions can identify
errors that iteratively strictly dominated strategies cannot.
Proposition 1 below states a fundamental relationship between dominated
actions and strategies. Any strategy that plays to reach information set I
(piσi (I) > 0) and plays a weakly dominated action a at I (σi(I, a) > 0)
is a weakly dominated strategy. Since strictly dominated actions are also
weakly dominated, it follows from Proposition 1 that any strategy that plays
a strictly dominated action is a weakly dominated strategy. We provide
a proof sketch of the proposition below, while full proofs can be found in
Appendix A.
Proposition 1. If a is a weakly dominated action at I ∈ Ii and σi ∈ Σi
satisfies piσi (I)σi(I, a) > 0, then σi is a weakly dominated strategy.
Proof Sketch. By definition of action dominance, there exists a strategy
σ′i ∈ Σi such that vi(I, σ(I→a)) ≤ vi(I, (σ′i, σ−i) for all opponent profiles σ−i ∈
Σ−i. One can then construct a strategy σ′′i that follows σi everywhere except
within the subtree rooted at I, where instead we follow a mixture of σi and
σ′i. The weight in this mixture assigned to σ
′
i is (1 − σi(I, a)) > 0. The
strategy σi is then weakly dominated by σ
′′
i .
It is possible, however, for a dominated strategy to not play any domi-
nated actions. For example, consider the zero-sum extensive-form game in
Figure 2 where both players take two private actions. The pure strategy for
player 1 of playing b and then e is strictly dominated by the pure strategy
that plays a and then e because the latter strategy guarantees exactly 1 more
utility than the former, regardless of how player 2 plays. Similarly, the pure
strategy that plays a and then f is strictly dominated by the pure strategy
that plays b and then f . However, no action is even weakly dominated. For
instance, after playing a (or b), the utility player 1 receives for playing e can
be greater, equal to, or less than the utility for playing f depending on how
player 2 plays.
5. Theoretical Analysis
Clearly, one should never play a strictly dominated action or strategy as
there always exists a better alternative. Furthermore, if we make the com-
mon assumption that our opponents are rational and do not play strictly
14
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2 2
a b
c
e
1
c dd
f f f fe e e
0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 4 0 1 3 5 -1 -1 3 5 1 0 2 6 0
g h g h g h g h g h g h g h g h
Figure 2: A zero-sum extensive-form game with strictly dominated strategies, but no
strictly or weakly dominated actions. Nodes connected by a dashed line are in the same
information set. Terminal values indicate utilities for player 1.
dominated actions or strategies themselves, then we should never play it-
eratively strictly dominated actions or strategies. In zero-sum games, CFR
converges to a Nash equilibrium, and so the average profile is guaranteed to
eliminate strictly dominated strategies. For non-zero-sum games, however,
Abou Risk and Szafron [2] demonstrate that CFR may not converge to a
Nash equilibrium. In this section, we provide theoretical evidence that CFR
does eliminate (i.e., play with probability zero) strictly dominated actions
and strategies.
We begin by showing that in normal-form games, a class of regret mini-
mization algorithms, including regret matching, all remove iteratively strictly
dominated strategies. This is a simple result that, to our knowledge, was pre-
viously unknown. Recall that the support of a strategy σi, supp(σi), is the
set of actions assigned positive probability by σi.
Theorem 2. Let σ1, σ2, ... be a sequence of strategy profiles in a normal-form
game where all players’ strategies are computed by regret minimization algo-
rithms where for all i ∈ N , a ∈ Ai, if RTi (a) < 0 and RTi (a) < maxb∈Ai RTi (b),
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then σT+1i (a) = 0. If σi is an iteratively strictly dominated strategy, then there
exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, supp(σi) * supp(σTi ).
Proof Sketch. For the non-iterative dominance case, by strict domination
of σi, there exists another strategy σ
′
i ∈ Σi such that
 = min
a−i∈A−i
ui(σ
′
i, a−i)− ui(σi, a−i) > 0.
One can then show that there exists an action a ∈ supp(σi) such that
RTi (a) ≤ −T + max
b∈Ai
RTi (b) ≤ −T +RT,+i .
Since RT,+i /T → 0 as T → ∞, it follows that RTi (a) < 0 after some finite
number of iterations T0. By our assumption, this implies a /∈ supp(σTi ) for
all T ≥ T0 as desired. Using the fact that new iterative dominances only
arise from removing actions and never from removing mixed strategies [16],
iterative dominance is proven by induction on the finite number of iteratively
dominated pure strategies that must first be removed to exhibit domination
of σi.
Note that regret matching is a regret minimization algorithm that satisfies
the conditions required by Theorem 2, as long as when the denominator of
equation (3) is zero, we choose σT+1i (a) = 0 when R
T
i (a) < maxb∈Ai R
T
i (b).
Also, if a pure strategy si(a) = 1 is iteratively strictly dominated, then
Theorem 2 implies that σTi never plays action a after a finite number of
iterations.
We now turn our attention to extensive-form games, which are our pri-
mary concern. Here, the linear program (1) cannot be applied to find non-
iteratively strictly dominated strategies in even moderately-sized extensive-
form games as the programs would require a number of constraints exponen-
tial in the size of the game. On the other hand, we can apply CFR.
First, we consider the removal of iteratively strictly dominated actions.
Our results rely on two conditions. Let xT be the number of iterations t
where
∑
a∈A(I) R
t,+
i (I, a) = 0 for some i ∈ N and I ∈ Ii, 1 ≤ t ≤ T . The
first condition we require is that xT be sublinear in T . Intuitively, this is
necessary because otherwise, the denominator of equation (5) is zero too
often, and so regret matching too often yields an arbitrary strategy at some
I ∈ Ii that potentially plays a dominated action. While we cannot prove that
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this condition always holds, we show empirically that xT/T decreases over
time in the next section. Next, for I ∈ Ii and δ ≥ 0, define Σδ(I) = {σ ∈
Σ |∑h∈I piσ−i(h) ≥ δ} to be the set of profiles where the probability that the
opponents play to reach I,
∑
h∈I pi
σ
−i(h), is at least δ. The second condition
we require is that the opponents reach each information set I containing
a dominated action often enough, meaning that there exist real numbers
δ, γ > 0 and an integer T ′ such that for all T ≥ T ′, |Σδ(I) ∩ {σt | T ′ ≤
t ≤ T}| ≥ γT . This condition appears necessary because the magnitude of
the counterfactual regret |rti(I, a)| = |vi(I, σt(I→a))−vi(σt)| ≤ ∆i
∑
h∈I pi
σt
−i(h)
is weighted by the probability of the opponents reaching I. Thus, if the
opponents reach I with probability zero, then we will stop learning how to
adjust our strategy. Since it could take several iterations to eliminate an
iteratively strictly dominated action, we may end up stuck playing such an
action when I is not reached by the opponents often enough.
Theorem 3. Let σ1, σ2, ... be strategy profiles generated by CFR in an
extensive-form game, let I ∈ Ii, and let a be an iteratively strictly domi-
nated action at I, where removal in sequence of the iteratively strictly dom-
inated actions a1, ..., ak at I1, ..., Ik respectively yields iterative dominance of
ak+1 = a. If for 1 ≤ ` ≤ k + 1, there exist real numbers δ`, γ` > 0 and an
integer T` such that for all T ≥ T`, |Σδ`(I`) ∩ {σt | T` ≤ t ≤ T}| ≥ γ`T , then
(i) there exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, RTi (I, a) < 0,
(ii) if limT→∞ xT/T = 0, then limT→∞ yT (I, a)/T = 0, where yT (I, a) is
the number of iterations 1 ≤ t ≤ T satisfying σt(I, a) > 0, and
(iii) if limT→∞ xT/T = 0, then limT→∞ piσ¯
T
i (I)σ¯
T
i (I, a) = 0.
Proof Sketch. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, there exists an  > 0
and a term F such that
RTi (I, a) ≤ −γT + F where lim
T→∞
F
T
= 0.
Again, this implies that there exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0,
RTi (I, a) < 0, establishing part (i). Since CFR applies regret match-
ing at I, part (i) and equation (3) imply that for all T ≥ T0, either∑
b∈A(I)R
T,+
i (I, b) = 0 or σ
T+1
i (I, a) = 0. From this, we have
lim
T→∞
yT (I, a)
T
≤ lim
T→∞
yT0(I, a) + xT
T
= 0,
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proving part (ii). Finally, part (iii) follows according to
lim
T→∞
piσ¯
T
i (I)σ¯
T
i (I, a) = lim
T→∞
∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (I)σ
t
i(I, a)
T
≤ lim
T→∞
yT (I, a)
T
= 0,
where the first equality is by the definition of the average strategy and the
inequality is by definition of yT (I, a).
Part (iii) of Theorem 3 says that an iteratively strictly dominated action
is not reached or is removed from the average profile σ¯T in the limit, whereas
part (i) suggests that iteratively strictly dominated actions are removed from
the current profile σT after just a finite number of iterations (except possibly
when
∑
a∈A(I) R
T,+
i (I, a) = 0). Finally, part (ii) states that the number of
current profiles that play an iteratively strictly dominated action a at I,
yT (I, a), is sublinear in T .
Next, we show that the profiles generated by CFR eliminate all iteratively
strictly dominated strategies, assuming again that xT/T → 0.
Theorem 4. Let σ1, σ2, ... be strategy profiles generated by CFR in an
extensive-form game, and let σi be an iteratively strictly dominated strategy.
Then,
(i) there exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, there exist I ∈ Ii,
a ∈ A(I) such that piσi (I)σi(I, a) > 0 and RTi (I, a) < 0, and
(ii) if limT→∞ xT/T = 0, then limT→∞ yT (σi)/T = 0, where yT (σi) is the
number of iterations 1 ≤ t ≤ T satisfying supp(σi) ⊆ supp(σti).
Proof Sketch. For σi ∈ Σi, define
RTi,full(σi) =
T∑
t=1
(ui(σi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σt)).
Similar to the proof of Theorems 2 and 3, there exists an  > 0 and a term
F ′ such that
RTi,full(σi) ≤ −T + F ′ where lim
T→∞
F ′
T
= 0. (7)
Next, one can show that
RTi,full(σi) =
∑
I∈Ii
piσi (I)
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)R
T
i (I, a). (8)
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Figure 3: A two-player non-zero-sum extensive-form game where each player has a single
information set.
Since piσi (I), σi(I, a) ≥ 0, it follows by equations (7) and (8) that after a finite
number of iterations T0, there exist I ∈ Ii, a ∈ A(I) such that piσi (I)σi(I, a) >
0 and RTi (I, a) < 0, establishing part (i). Part (ii) then follows as in the proof
of part (ii) of Theorem 3.
Similar to part (i) of Theorem 3, part (i) of Theorem 4 says that after
a finite number of iterations, there is always some information set I that
the dominated strategy σi plays to reach and some action at I played by σi
which σTi does not play (except possibly when
∑
a∈A(I) R
T,+
i (I, a) = 0), and
so σTi 6= σi. Part (ii) similarly states that the number of profiles generated
whose support contains σi, y
T (σi), is sublinear in T . Notice that Theorems
2 and 4 do not draw any conclusions upon the average profile σ¯T . Perhaps
surprisingly, it is possible to have a sequence of profiles with no regret where
the average profile converges to a strictly dominated strategy. Consider the
two-player non-zero-sum game in Figure 3. The sequence of pure strategy
profiles (A, a), (B, b), (A, a), (B, b), ... has no positive regret for either player,
and in the limit, the average profile for player 1, σ¯T1 , plays A and B each
with probability 0.5. However, σ¯T1 is strictly dominated by the pure strategy
that always plays C.
Our final theoretical contribution shows that in two-player non-zero-sum
games, regret minimization yields a bound on the average strategy profile’s
distance from being a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5. Let , δ ≥ 0 and let σ1, σ2, ..., σT be strategy profiles in a two-
player game. If RTi /T ≤  for i = 1, 2, and |u1 + u2| ≤ δ, then σ¯T is a
2(+ δ)-Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. We generalize the proof of [18, p. 11]. For i = 1, 2, by the definition
of regret, we have
 ≥ 1
T
max
σ′i∈Σi
T∑
t=1
(
ui(σ
′
i, σ
t
−i)− ui(σt)
)
= max
σ′i∈Σi
ui(σ
′
i, σ¯
T
−i)−
1
T
T∑
t=1
ui(σ
t)
by linearity of expectation. Summing the two inequalities for i = 1, 2 gives
2 ≥ max
σ′1∈Σ1
u1(σ
′
1, σ¯
T
2 ) + max
σ′2∈Σ2
u2(σ¯
T
1 , σ
′
2)−
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
u1(σ
t) + u2(σ
t)
)
≥ max
σ′1∈Σ1
u1(σ
′
1, σ¯
T
2 ) + max
σ′2∈Σ2
(−u1(σ¯T1 , σ′2)− δ)− δ
= max
σ′1∈Σ1
u1(σ
′
1, σ¯
T
2 )− min
σ′2∈Σ2
u1(σ¯
T
1 , σ
′
2)− 2δ
≥ max
σ′1∈Σ1
u1(σ
′
1, σ¯
T
2 )− u1(σ¯T )− 2δ,
where the last line follows by setting σ′2 = σ¯
T
2 . Rearranging terms gives
max
σ′1∈Σ1
u1(σ
′
1, σ¯
T
2 ) ≤ u1(σ¯T ) + 2(+ δ).
Applying the same arguments but reversing the roles of the two players gives
max
σ′2∈Σ2
u2(σ¯
T
1 , σ
′
2) ≤ u2(σ¯T ) + 2(+ δ),
and thus by definition σ¯T is a 2(+ δ)-Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5 is a generalization of Theorem 1. When δ = 0, the game is
zero-sum, and so the average profile converges to equilibrium as  → 0. In
addition, when the players’ utilities sum to at most δ > 0, then as  → 0,
the average profile converges to a 2δ-Nash equilibrium.
5.1. Remarks
Theorems 2, 3, and 4 provide evidence that regret minimization removes
iterative strict domination. Of course, eliminating strict domination may
not provide any useful insights in games where few strategies are iteratively
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strictly dominated. Despite this obvious limitation, Theorems 3 and 4 pro-
vide a better understanding of the strategies generated by CFR in non-zero-
sum games than what coarse correlated equilibria provide. In the next sec-
tion, we show that avoiding iteratively dominated actions is enough to per-
form well in Kuhn Poker. However, large games such as three-player Texas
Hold’em are too complex to analyze action and strategic dominance beyond
obvious errors, such as folding the best hand. It remains open as to how well
our theory explains the success of CFR in these large games.
Perhaps more importantly, the theory developed here has guided us to a
more efficient adaptation of CFR, in both time and memory, for games with
more than two players. Given Theorems 3 and 4 and given we have only finite
time, we suggest using the current profile in practice rather than the average.
In fact, while Theorem 5 says that the average profile converges to a 2δ-Nash
equilibrium in two-player games, there is no clear case for preferring the
average over the current profile in three-or-more-player games. Furthermore,
the average profile is not used in any computations during CFR, so when
discarding the average, there is no reason to store the cumulative profile.
This reduces the memory requirements of CFR by a factor of two, since then
only one value per information set, action pair (RTi (I, a)) must be stored
as opposed to two. Not only does this allow us to tackle larger games, the
extra memory might be utilized to compute even stronger strategies than
previously possible.
We are not the first to consider using the current profile. In CFR-BR, a
recently developed CFR variant for zero-sum games that replaces one player
with a worst-case opponent, the current profile converges to equilibrium with
high probability [27, Theorem 4]. The authors discuss similar benefits when
discarding the cumulative profile in CFR-BR and just using the current strat-
egy profile. Nonetheless, we are the first to suggest using the current profile
both with the original CFR algorithm and in games with more than two
players. The next section explores these new insights.
6. Empirical Study
Using poker as a testbed, we design several experiments to test our theory
developed in the previous section. While previous work has applied CFR
across several domains [22], poker games are of particular interest as they
are widely popular and many computer agents from past ACPC events are
21
available to test against. New games can also be easily created by adjusting
the number of players, cards, and betting rounds that take place.
6.1. Poker Games
We consider three different poker games for our experiments in this sec-
tion. The first is Kuhn Poker, which was introduced in Section 2.
Our second game and our main game of interest is three-player limit Texas
Hold’em. To begin the game, the player to the left of the dealer posts a small
blind of five chips, the next player posts a big blind of ten chips, and each
player is dealt two private cards from a standard 52-card deck. Texas Hold’em
consists of four betting rounds with three, one, and one public card(s) being
revealed before the second, third, and fourth rounds respectively. All bets
and raises are fixed to ten chips in the first two rounds and twenty chips in
the last two rounds; players may not go all-in as in no-limit poker. There
is also a maximum of four bets or raises allowed per round. At the end of
the fourth round, the players that did not fold reveal their hand. The player
with the highest ranked poker hand made up of any combination of their two
private cards and five public cards wins all the chips played.
With three players, limit Texas Hold’em contains approximately 5× 1017
information sets and CFR would require hundreds of petabytes of RAM to
minimize regret in such a large game. Instead, a common approach is to use
state-space abstraction to produce a similar game of a tractable size by merg-
ing information sets or restricting the action space [6, 7]. For Texas Hold’em,
we merge card deals into buckets so that hands falling into the same bucket
are indistinguishable. We can then control the size of the abstract game by
increasing or decreasing the number of buckets used on each round. However,
increasing abstraction size not only increases memory requirements, but also
increases the number of iterations required to minimize average regret (see
equation (6)). There are just three actions (fold, check/call, and bet/raise)
available in limit Hold’em, and thus we do not abstract on actions. Note
that applying CFR to an abstraction of Texas Hold’em yields no guarantees
about regret minimization or domination avoidance in the real game (but are
guaranteed in the abstract game). Furthermore, we will use imperfect recall
abstractions that forget the buckets from previous rounds and break our as-
sumption of perfect recall stated in Section 2. Despite these complications,
abstraction and imperfect recall still appear to work well in practice [3, 28].
Thirdly, we also consider the game of 2-1 Hold’em [29] that is identical
to Texas Hold’em, except consists of only the first two betting rounds and
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Table 1: Results of a six-agent mock tournament of Kuhn poker. Reported scores for the
row strategy against the column strategy are in expected milli-chips per game, averaged
over both player orderings.
Uni ND NID NE-0 NE-0.5 NE-1 Overall
Uni - -270 -187 -111 -138 -166 -174
ND 270 - -31 -55 -34 -13 27
NID 187 31 - 0 0 0 43
NE-0 111 55 0 - 0 0 33
NE-0.5 138 34 0 0 - 0 34
NE-1 166 13 0 0 0 - 36
only one raise is allowed per round. Two-player 2-1 Hold’em has roughly
16 million information sets, which is small enough to apply CFR without
abstraction. Furthermore, because full tree traversals in CFR are very ex-
pensive, we instead use sampling variants that only traverse a smaller subset
of information sets on each iteration. We found that the most efficient vari-
ant for 2-1 Hold’em was Public Chance Sampling [29] and for three-player
limit Texas Hold’em was External Sampling [30].
6.2. Dominated Actions and Performance in Kuhn Poker
To begin, we investigate the correlation between the presence of iteratively
dominated actions in one’s strategy with the performance of the strategy in
a mock ACPC-style tournament. In the ACPC, each game is evaluated ac-
cording to two different scoring metrics. The total bankroll (TBR) metric
simply ranks competitors according to their overall earnings in money per
game averaged across all possible opponents. The instant runoff (IRO) met-
ric, however, ranks competitors by iteratively eliminating the lowest scoring
agent from consideration and reevaluating the overall scores by averaging
only across the remaining agents. In a zero-sum game, a Nash equilibrium
strategy is optimal for winning IRO since it never loses in expectation to any
opponent.
We ran a six-agent mock tournament of Kuhn poker, which was intro-
duced in Section 2. Kuhn poker is a small enough game where we can easily
identify all iteratively dominated actions and all Nash equilibrium strategies
have already been classified [8]. Our agents consist of a uniform random
strategy (Uni), a strategy that plays no dominated actions (does not call
23
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 10
106 107 108
D
i s t
a n
c e
 f r
o m
 e
q u
i l i
b r
i u
m
 i n
 t i
l t e
d  
g a
m
e  
( m
b b
/ g )
Iterations
w = 0
w = 7
w = 14
w = 35
Current w = 0
(a) Orange tilt
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 10
106 107 108
D
ist
an
ce
 fr
om
 e
qu
ili
br
iu
m
 in
 ti
lte
d 
ga
m
e 
(m
bb
/g)
Iterations
w = 0
w = 7
w = 14
w = 35
Current w = 0
(b) Green tilt
Figure 4: Log-log plots measuring the distance from equilibrium of CFR strategies in
w%-tilted 2-1 Hold’em over iterations. Distance is measured in milli-big-blinds per game
(mbb/g).
with the Jack or fold with the King) but is otherwise uniform random (ND),
a strategy that plays no iteratively dominated actions (no dominated actions
and does not bet with the Queen) but is otherwise uniform random (NID),
and three Nash equilibrium strategies (NE-γ) for γ = 0, 0.5, 1, where γ is
the probability of betting with the King. A cross table of the results for
each pair of strategies is given in Table 1. For IRO, after successively elim-
inating Uni and then ND, there is a four-way tie for first place between the
three equilibrium strategies and NID. In addition, NID happens to win TBR,
though none of the strategies are designed with TBR in mind. This mock
tournament provides one example where high performance can be achieved
by simply avoiding iteratively dominated errors.
6.3. Distance from Equilibrium in Two-Player Non-Zero-Sum Games
Our next experiment applies CFR to non-zero-sum tilted variants of two-
player 2-1 Hold’em. Tilted games are constructed by rewarding or penalizing
players depending on the outcome of the game. This can lead to more ag-
gressive play when applied to the regular, non-tilted game and were used by
the poker program Polaris that won the 2008 Man-vs-Machine competition
[3]. Here, we use the orange tilt that gives the winning player an extra w%
bonus, and the green tilt that both reduces the losing player’s loss in a show-
down (i.e., when neither player folded) by w% and penalizes the winning
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player by w% when the losing player folded. In both of these games, we
can bound |u1 + u2| ≤ ∆iw/100, and so Theorem 5 states that CFR will
converge to at least a ∆iw/50-Nash equilibrium. For w ∈ {0, 7, 14, 35}, we
ran CFR and measured how far the average profile was from equilibrium in
the w%-tilted game by calculating maxσi∈Σi ui(σi, σ¯
T
−i) and averaging over
both players i = 1, 2. In addition, we also measured the same value for the
current profile in the non-tilted game (w = 0). These results are shown in
Figure 4. As expected, in the non-tilted game (w = 0), the average profile
is approaching a Nash equilibrium. For the tilted games, we see that as w is
increased, most of the profiles are further from equilibrium, coinciding with
Theorem 5. However, the strategies are much closer to equilibrium than the
distance guaranteed by Theorem 5 (note that ∆i = 8 big blinds) and only
in the green tilt with w = 35 is it obvious that CFR is not converging to an
exact equilibrium. Of course, Theorem 5 only provides an upper bound on
the average profile’s distance from equilibrium, and this bound appears to be
quite loose. These results warrant further investigation into regret minimiza-
tion in two-player non-zero-sum games. Finally, it is clear that the current
strategy profile with w = 0 is not converging to equilibrium. Thus, unlike
CFR-BR [27], the average profile from CFR is generally preferred to the
current profile in two-player games as it gives a better worst-case guarantee.
6.4. Positive Regret and Current Profile in Three-Player Limit Hold’em
Next, we examine how often
∑
a∈A(I) R
T,+
i (I, a) = 0 as required by parts
of Theorems 3 and 4. CFR was applied to two different abstractions of
three-player limit Texas Hold’em. The first, labeled 1X, consists of 169, 900,
100, and 25 buckets per betting round respectively. This abstraction size was
used by the winning agents of the 2010 ACPC 3-player events [5] and contains
about 262 million information sets. The second abstraction, labeled 2X, uses
169, 1800, 200, and 50 buckets per betting round respectively, resulting in an
abstract game approximately twice the size. All of our abstractions were built
off-line using a k-means clustering algorithm on hand strength distribution
described by Johanson et al. [7]. For each abstraction, we measured ξT , the
total number of times where External Sampling traversed an information
set that had no positive regret at any action. The average of ξT is plotted
over iterations T in Figure 5a. In both cases, we see that encountering an
information set with no positive regret becomes less frequent over time, where
we eventually encounter fewer than one such information set per iteration on
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Figure 5: (a) Log-log plot measuring the frequency at which an information set is visited
where every action has nonpositive cumulative counterfactual regret during CFR in the 1X
and 2X abstractions of three-player limit Texas Hold’em. (b) Performance over iterations
(log scale) of three strategy profiles in a four-agent round-robin competition of three-player
limit Texas Hold’em, measured in milli-big-blinds per game. Current-2X is the current
profile generated by CFR in the 2X abstraction that is twice as large as the 1X abstraction
used to generate Average-1X and Current-1X. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals
over 50 competitions.
average. While we cannot guarantee that xT/T ≈ ξT/T → 0 as required by
Theorems 3 and 4, we at least have evidence that having no positive regret
becomes a rare event. By part (i) of Theorems 3 and 4, this means that
iteratively strictly dominated actions and strategies will likely be avoided in
the current strategy profile.
Using these same abstractions of three-player Hold’em, we now show that
the current profile can reach higher performance faster than the average
profile, and that the extra savings in memory acquired by discarding the
average profile can be utilized to generate even stronger strategies. In this
experiment, we generated three different strategy profiles with CFR, saving
the profiles at various iteration counts. For the 1X abstraction, we kept both
the average and the current profile, while for the 2X abstraction, we kept just
the current profile. Note that running CFR on the 2X abstract game without
keeping the average profile requires no more RAM than running CFR on the
1X abstraction and keeping both profiles. For each of our saved profiles, we
then played a four-agent round-robin competition (RRC) against the base
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strategy profiles1 from the top 2009, 2010, and 2011 ACPC three-player
entries. Figure 5b shows the amount won by each of our three strategies over
iterations, averaged over 50 RRCs consisting of 10,000 games per match.
Clearly, the 1X current profile reaches strong play much sooner than the
average profile, which requires about ten times the number of iterations to
reach the same level of performance. Furthermore, while more iterations are
needed in the 2X abstraction as expected by equation (6), we see that 2X
eventually yields a current profile that outperforms both profiles in the 1X
abstraction.
7. A New Champion Three-Player Limit Texas Hold’em Agent
Finally, this section presents a new three-player limit Texas Hold’em agent
that won the three-player events of the 2012 ACPC. Before presenting this
new agent in detail, we summarize the previous competition winners.
7.1. Previous ACPC Winners
As we discussed in Section 6.1, abstraction is necessary in order to feasibly
apply CFR to Texas Hold’em. Despite the loss of theoretical guarantees and
the existence of abstraction pathologies [31], we generally see increased per-
formance as we increase the granularity of our abstractions; in other words,
more buckets are typically better [3, 7]. Abstraction granularity, however,
is restricted by computational resources as CFR requires space linear in the
size of the abstract game.
One approach to improving abstraction granularity is to partition a game
into smaller pieces and run CFR on each piece, either independently [2, 5, 32]
or concurrently [5]. Strategies for each piece are referred to as experts that
during a match, only act when play reaches their piece of the game. The
winner of the 2011 ACPC three-player instant runoff (IRO) event was an
agent built with such expert strategies. Similar to Abou Risk and Szafron’s
heads-up experts, the 2011 experts only acted in what appear to be the four
most common two-player scenarios that resulted after one player had folded
[2, Table 4]. In particular, an expert only acted after the opening sequence
of player actions was f , rf , rrf , or rcf , where f denotes the fold action,
1The 2010 and 2011 agents employed special experts in some two-player scenarios that
were not used in this specific experiment. More details regarding these agents are provided
later in Section 7.
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c denotes call, and r denotes raise. Two-player scenarios are convenient to
work with since the elimination of one player greatly reduces the number
of possible future action sequences and thus reduces the size of the game.
These experts were computed independently using an abstraction with 169,
180,000, 540,000, and 78,480 buckets on each of the four betting rounds
respectively. Here and throughout this section, the same k-means clustering
technique on hand strength distribution from Section 6.4 was used to bucket
hands and we refer the reader to Johanson et al. [7] for more details. To play
the rest of the game, a base strategy for the full, unpartitioned three-player
game was computed with CFR using an abstraction with 169, 10,000, 5450,
and 500 buckets per round respectively. Thus, the experts could distinguish
between many more different hands compared to the base strategy, even
though the abstract game for the base strategy still contained approximately
5.9 billion information sets. More details about this expert construction
process are found in the description of the 2010 ACPC three-player IRO
winner [5] that was identical to the 2011 agent but used coarser abstractions.
In 2009, the first year of the three-player events, the IRO winner was a simple
base strategy computed with CFR in a very coarse abstraction [2].
7.2. A New Three-Player Limit Texas Hold’em Agent
As demonstrated above, partitioning a game into smaller pieces is a conve-
nient method for increasing abstraction granularity. For the 2012 ACPC, we
again used this same methodology to construct our new three-player limit
Texas Hold’em agent. This time, rather than partitioning the game into
special two-player scenarios, we partitioned the histories into two parts: an
important part and an unimportant part. The important histories were de-
fined as follows. First, we scanned all of the 2011 ACPC match logs that the
winning IRO agent presented above played in and for each betting sequence,
we calculated the frequency at which the agent was faced with a decision
at that sequence. For example, the frequency the agent was faced with a
decision at the empty betting sequence was 1/3 since positions in the game
rotate, making the agent first to act once in every three hands. Next, we
multiplied each of these frequencies by the pot size at that betting sequence.
For instance, we multiplied the 1/3 frequency for the empty betting sequence
by 15 since the game is played with a small blind of 5 chips and a big blind of
10 chips, creating an initial pot of 15 chips. For each history, if this value for
the history’s betting sequence was greater than 1/100, then the history was
labeled as important. Since (1/3) · 15 = 5 > 1/100, the empty sequence was
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labeled as important. In addition, any prefix of an important history was
also labeled as important, while the remaining histories were labeled as unim-
portant. Only 0.023% of the nonterminal betting sequences in three-player
limit Hold’em belonged to the important part. While many of the important
histories overlapped with the two-player scenarios used by the 2011 agent,
there were several three-player scenarios, such as the empty sequence and
the rcc sequence, that were labeled important.
Using this partition, we employed a very fine-grained abstraction on the
important part and a coarse abstraction on the unimportant part. This way,
our agent can distinguish between many more hands at the few sequences that
historically were reached more frequently or that had lots of chips at stake.
Our coarse abstraction for the unimportant part used the same 169, 1800,
200, and 50 buckets per round employed by our 2X abstraction in Section 6.4,
while our fine-grained abstraction for the important part used 169, 180,000,
765,000, and 840,000 buckets per round respectively. Strategies for both
parts were computed concurrently [5] across the 2.5 billion information set
abstract game resulting from the two abstractions. Note that this abstract
game is less than half the size of the abstract game used to compute the base
strategy in 2011, meaning that less computer memory was required to run
CFR. We used a parallel implementation of the External Sampling variant
of CFR mentioned in Section 6.1, which ran for 16 days using 48 2.1 GHz
AMD processors on a machine with 256GB of total RAM (though less than
100GB of RAM were needed).
7.3. Results
The 2012 competition results [4] are presented in Table 2. Our 2012
agent, name Hyperborean3p, won both the IRO and TBR events by significant
margins. In addition, we compared our new agent against the previous IRO
winners from the 2009, 2010, and 2011 competitions by running a four-agent
round-robin competition (RRC). Table 3 presents the results averaged across
10 RRCs. We see that not only does the 2012 agent require less computer
memory to generate than the 2011 agent, the 2012 agent earns 13 milli-big-
blinds per game more on average.
Finally, all of the competition winners from 2009 to 2012 used the average
strategy profiles generated by CFR. In light of our new insights from Section 5
and as a final validation of our CFR modification, we reran CFR on the 2012
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Table 2: Results of the 2012 ACPC three-player limit Hold’em events [4]. Earnings are in
milli-big-blinds per game (mbb/g) and errors indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Total Bankroll
Agent Total Earnings
Hyperborean3p 28± 5
little.rock −4± 7
neo.poker.lab −11± 5
sartre −12± 7
Instant Runoff
Agent Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Hyperborean3p 37± 5 28± 5 23± 8
little.rock 13± 6 −4± 7 −9± 9
neo.poker.lab 7± 5 −11± 5 −14± 6
sartre 5± 7 −12± 7 Eliminated
dcubot −62± 8 Eliminated Eliminated
Table 3: Results of a four-agent RRC between the ACPC IRO three-player winners from
2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. Earnings are in milli-big-blinds per game for the row player
against the column players and errors indicate 95% confidence intervals.
09,10 09,11 09,12 10,11 10,12 11,12 Overall
2009 - - - −21± 7 −26± 5 −31± 5 −26± 4
2010 - 0± 4 −5± 3 - - −23± 5 −10± 4
2011 21± 6 - 6± 5 - 8± 5 - 11± 4
2012 31± 5 25± 5 - 16± 4 - - 24± 4
abstract game using the same CFR implementation on the same machine,
except now saving the current profile and discarding the average. For several
checkpoints of the original average strategy and the new current strategy,
we played 10 RRCs versus the 2009, 2010, and 2011 ACPC IRO winners
and plotted the results in Figure 6. While the average strategy takes 20
days before earning 25 milli-big-blinds per game, the current strategy reaches
better performance in just 5 days while requiring only half the memory (less
than 50GB of RAM) to compute.
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Figure 6: Performance over time (in days) of the average profile that won the three-player
events of the 2012 ACPC, and of the current profile computed in the same abstract game.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals over 10 competitions versus the top 2009,
2010, and 2011 ACPC IRO three-player agents.
8. Conclusion
This paper provides the first theoretical advancements for applying CFR
to games that are not two-player zero-sum. While previous work had demon-
strated that CFR does not necessarily converge to a Nash equilibrium in such
games, we have provided theoretical evidence that CFR eliminates iteratively
strictly dominated actions and strategies. Thus, CFR provides a mechanism
for removing iterative strict domination that was otherwise infeasible with
previous techniques for large, non-zero-sum extensive-form games. In addi-
tion, our theory is the first step to understanding why CFR generates well-
performing strategies in non-zero-sum games. Though our experiments show
that the current profile reaches a high level of performance faster than the
average, it remains unclear whether this is due to faster removal of domina-
tion that our theory illustrates. Nonetheless, we have shown that just using
the current profile gives a more time and memory efficient implementation of
CFR for games with more than two players that can lead to increased perfor-
mance. Furthermore, we presented a new three-player limit Texas Hold’em
agent that won both three-player events of the 2012 Annual Computer Poker
Competition. Our agent uses a new partition of the game tree, requires less
computer memory to generate than the 2011 winner, and outperforms the
previous competition winners by a significant margin.
Future work will look at finding additional properties of CFR in non-
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zero-sum games that go beyond domination. Additionally, we would like
to compare CFR’s average and current profiles in other large, non-zero-sum
domains outside of poker. Finally, this work has only considered the prob-
lem of computing strategies for play against a set of unknown opponents.
In poker and other repeated games, we often gain information about the
opponents’ strategies over time. For repeated non-zero-sum games, using
opponent modelling to adjust one’s strategy could drastically improve play.
Acknowledgements
Thank-you to Martin Zinkevich and the members of the Computer Poker
Research Group at the University of Alberta for helpful conversations per-
taining to this research. This research was supported by Alberta Innovates
– Technology Futures and computing resources were provided by WestGrid
and Compute Canada.
Vitae
Richard Gibson is a Ph.D. student in the Computing Science Department
at the University of Alberta. He is a member of the Computer Poker Research
Group and primary author of Hyperborean3p, the reigning three-player limit
Texas Hold’em champion of the Annual Computer Poker Competition. His
32
research interests generally lie at the intersection of artificial intelligence and
games.
Appendix A. Proofs of Technical Results
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 1 and Theorems 2, 3, and 4. For
I ∈ Ii, define
D(I) = {I ′ ∈ Ii | ∃h ∈ I, h′ ∈ I ′ such that h v h′}
to be the set of information sets descending from I.
Proposition 1. If a is a weakly dominated action at I ∈ Ii and σi ∈ Σi
satisfies piσi (I)σi(I, a) > 0, then σi is a weakly dominated strategy.
Proof. Since a is weakly dominated, there exists a strategy σ′i ∈ Σi such that
vi(I, σ(I→a)) ≤ vi(I, (σ′i, σ−i)) for all opponent profiles σ−i ∈ Σ−i, and there
exists an opponent profile σ′−i such that vi(I, (σi(I→a), σ
′
−i)) < vi(I, (σ
′
i, σ
′
−i)).
Let σˆi be the strategy σi except at I, where σˆi(I, a) = 0 and σˆi(I, b) =
σi(I, b)/(1 − σi(I, a)) for all b ∈ A(I), b 6= a. Next, for all J ∈ Ii and
b ∈ A(J), define
σ′′i (J, b) =

piσi (I)
(
σi(I,a)pi
σ′
i (I,J)σ
′
i(J,b)+(1−σi(I,a))piσˆi (I,J)σˆi(J,b)
)
piσi (I)(σi(I,a)piσ
′
i (I,J)+(1−σi(I,a))piσˆi (I,J))
if J ∈ D(I)
(and arbitrary when the
denominator is zero),
σi(J, b) if J /∈ D(I).
One can verify that σ′′i ∈ Σi is a valid strategy for player i. Now, fix σ−i ∈
Σ−i. Then,
ui(σi, σ−i) =
∑
z∈ZI
piσ(z)ui(z) +
∑
z /∈ZI
piσ(z)ui(z)
= piσi (I)
∑
b∈A(I)
σi(I, b)vi(I, σ(I→b)) +
∑
z /∈ZI
piσ(z)ui(z)
≤ piσi (I)σi(I, a)vi(I, (σ′i, σ−i))
+ piσi (I)(1− σi(I, a))
∑
b∈A(I)
b 6=a
σˆi(I, b)vi(I, (σˆi(I→b), σ−i))
+
∑
z /∈ZI
piσ(z)ui(z)
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= piσi (I)vi(I, (σ
′′
i , σ−i)) +
∑
z /∈ZI
piσ(z)ui(z)
= ui(σ
′′
i , σ−i).
Thus, ui(σi, σ−i) ≤ ui(σ′′i , σ−i) for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i. A similar argument shows
that ui(σi, σ
′
−i) < ui(σ
′′
i , σ
′
−i), proving that σi is weakly dominated by σ
′′
i .
Next, we prove Theorem 2, using the fact that new iterative dominances
only arise from removing actions and never from removing mixed strategies
[16]:
Theorem 2. Let σ1, σ2, ... be a sequence of strategy profiles in a normal-form
game where all players’ strategies are computed by regret minimization algo-
rithms where for all i ∈ N , a ∈ Ai, if RTi (a) < 0 and RTi (a) < maxb∈Ai RTi (b),
then σT+1i (a) = 0. If σi is an iteratively strictly dominated strategy, then there
exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, supp(σi) * supp(σTi ).
Proof. Let a1, a2, ..., ak be iteratively strictly dominated actions (pure strate-
gies) for players j1, j2, ..., jk respectively that once removed in sequence yields
strict domination of σi. Let B−i = A−i\{a1, a2, ..., ak} be the set of opponent
actions other than a1, a2, ..., ak. Next, by iterative strict domination of σi
and because the game is finite, there exists another strategy σ′i ∈ Σi such
that
 = min
a−i∈B−i
ui(σ
′
i, a−i)− ui(σi, a−i) > 0,
so that ui(σi, a−i) ≤ ui(σ′i, a−i)−  for all a−i ∈ B−i. Then,∑
a∈Ai
σi(a)R
T
i (a) =
∑
a∈Ai
σi(a)R
T
i (a)−
∑
a∈Ai
σ′i(a)R
T
i (a) +
∑
a∈Ai
σ′i(a)R
T
i (a)
=
∑
a∈Ai
(σi(a)− σ′i(a))
T∑
t=1
(
ui(a, σ
t
−i)− ui(σt)
)
+
∑
a∈Ai
σ′i(a)R
T
i (a)
=
T∑
t=1
(
ui(σi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σ′i, σt−i)
)
+
∑
a∈Ai
σ′i(a)R
T
i (a)
=
∑
supp(σt−i)*B−i
1≤t≤T
(
ui(σi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σ′i, σt−i)
)
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+
∑
supp(σt−i)⊆B−i
1≤t≤T
(
ui(σi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σ′i, σt−i)
)
+
∑
a∈Ai
σ′i(a)R
T
i (a)
=
∑
supp(σt−i)*B−i
1≤t≤T
(
ui(σi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σ′i, σt−i)
)
+
∑
supp(σt−i)⊆B−i
1≤t≤T
∑
a−i∈B−i
σt−i(a−i) (ui(σi, a−i)− ui(σ′i, a−i))
+
∑
a∈Ai
σ′i(a)R
T
i (a), where σ−i(a−i) =
∏
j 6=i
σj(aj)
≤
∑
supp(σt−i)*B−i
1≤t≤T
(
ui(σi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σ′i, σt−i)
)
+
∑
supp(σt−i)⊆B−i
1≤t≤T
(−) + max
a∈Ai
RTi (a). (A.1)
We claim that there exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, there
exists a ∈ supp(σi) such that RTi (a) < 0 and RTi (a) < maxb∈Ai RTi (b). By
our assumption, this implies that for all T ≥ T0, there exists an action
a ∈ supp(σi) such that a /∈ supp(σTi ), establishing the theorem.
To complete the proof, it remains to establish the claim, which we prove
by strong induction on k. For the base case k = 0, we have B−i = A−i, and
so by equation (A.1) we have
min
a∈supp(σi)
RTi (a) ≤
∑
a∈Ai
σi(a)R
T
i (a)
≤ −T + max
a∈Ai
RTi (a) (A.2)
≤ −T +RT,+i .
Dividing both sides by T and taking the limit superior gives
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
min
a∈supp(σi)
RTi (a) ≤ −+ lim sup
T→∞
RT,+i
T
= −
< 0.
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Thus, there exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, RTi (a∗) < 0 where
a∗ = arg mina∈supp(σi)R
T
i (a). Also, by equation (A.2), R
T
i (a
∗) ≤ −T +
maxa∈Ai R
T
i (a) < maxa∈Ai R
T
i (a), completing the base case.
For the induction step, we may assume that there exist integers T1, ..., Tk
such that for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ k, T ≥ T`, RTj`(a`) < 0 and RTj`(a`) <
maxb∈Aj` R
T
j`
(b). This means that for all T ≥ T ′0 = max{T1, ..., Tk},
a` /∈ supp(σTj`) for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ k. Hence, supp(σT−i) ⊆ B−i for all T ≥ T ′0.
Therefore, again setting a∗ = arg mina∈supp(σi) R
T
i (a), by equation (A.1) we
have
RTi (a
∗) ≤
∑
a∈Ai
σi(a)R
T
i (a)
≤
∑
supp(σt−i)*B−i
1≤t≤T
(
ui(σi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σ′i, σt−i)
)
+
∑
supp(σt−i)⊆B−i
1≤t≤T
(−) + max
a∈Ai
RTi (a)
≤ T ′0∆i − (T − T ′0) + max
a∈Ai
RTi (a), where ∆i = max
a,a′∈A
ui(a)− ui(a′)
(A.3)
≤ T ′0∆i − (T − T ′0) +RT,+i .
Dividing both sides by T and taking the limit superior gives
lim sup
T→∞
RTi (a
∗)
T
≤ lim sup
T→∞
(
T ′0∆i
T
− (T − T
′
0)
T
+
RT,+i
T
)
= −
< 0.
Thus, there exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, T ′0∆i < (T − T ′0)
and RTi (a
∗) < 0. By equation (A.3), this also means that for T ≥ T0,
RTi (a
∗) < maxa∈Ai R
T
i (a), completing the induction step. This establishes
the claim and completes the proof.
Before proving Theorems 3 and 4, we need an additional lemma. For
σi ∈ Σi and I ∈ Ii, define the full counterfactual regret for σi at I to be
RTi,full(I, σi) =
T∑
t=1
(vi(I, (σi, σ
t
−i))− vi(I, σt)).
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We begin by relating full counterfactual regret to a sum over cumulative
counterfactual regrets. This step was part of the original CFR analysis [33],
but we relate these terms here in a slightly different form. For I, I ′ ∈ Ii,
h ∈ I, h′ ∈ I ′, and σi ∈ Σi, define piσi (I, I ′) = pii(h, h′), which is well-defined
due to perfect recall.
Lemma 1.
RTi,full(I, σi) =
∑
I′∈D(I)
piσi (I, I
′)
∑
a∈A(I′)
σi(I
′, a)RTi (I
′, a).
Proof. We prove the lemma by strong induction on |D(I)|. For I ∈ Ii and
a ∈ A(I), define
S(I, a) = {I ′ ∈ Ii |∃h ∈ I, h′ ∈ I ′ where ha v h′
and @h′′ ∈ Hi where ha v h′′ @ h′}
to be the set of all possible successor information sets for player i after taking
action a at I. In addition, define Z(I, a) to be the set of terminal histories
where the last action taken by player i was a at I. To begin,
RTi,full(I, σi) =
T∑
t=1
vi(I, (σi, σ
t
−i))−
T∑
t=1
vi(I, σ
t)
=
T∑
t=1
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)vi(I, (σi(I→a), σt−i))−
T∑
t=1
vi(I, σ
t)
=
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)
T∑
t=1
 ∑
z∈Z(I,a)
piσ
t
−i(z)ui(z)
+
∑
I′∈S(I,a)
vi(I
′, (σi, σt−i))
− T∑
t=1
vi(I, σ
t). (A.4)
For the base case D(I) = {I}, we have S(I, a) = ∅ and Z(I, a) = ZI , and so
the right hand side of equation (A.4) reduces to
∑
a∈A(I) σi(I, a)R
T
i (I, a) as
desired. For the induction step, note that |D(I ′)| < |D(I)| for all I ′ ∈ S(I, a),
and so we may apply the induction hypothesis to get, for all I ′ ∈ S(I, a),
T∑
t=1
vi(I
′, (σi, σt−i)) = R
T
i,full(I
′, σi) +
T∑
t=1
vi(I
′, σt)
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=
∑
I′′∈D(I′)
piσi (I
′, I ′′)
∑
b∈A(I′′)
σ(I ′′, b)RTi (I
′′, b)
+
T∑
t=1
vi(I
′, σt).
Finally, substituting into equation (A.4), we have
RTi,full(I, σi) =
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)
 T∑
t=1
∑
z∈Z(I,a)
piσ
t
−i(z)ui(z)
+
∑
I′∈S(I,a)
 ∑
I′′∈D(I′)
piσi (I
′, I ′′)
∑
b∈A(I′′)
σi(I
′′, b)RTi (I
′′, b)
+
T∑
t=1
vi(I
′, σt)
)]
−
T∑
t=1
vi(I, σ
t)
=
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)
T∑
t=1
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))−
T∑
t=1
vi(I, σ
t)
+
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)
∑
I′∈S(I,a)
 ∑
I′′∈D(I′)
piσi (I
′, I ′′)
∑
b∈A(I′′)
σi(I
′′, b)RTi (I
′′, b)

=
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)R
T
i (I, a)
+
∑
I′∈D(I)
I′ 6=I
piσi (I, I
′)
∑
b∈A(I′)
σi(I
′, b)RTi (I
′, b)
=
∑
I′∈D(I)
piσi (I, I
′)
∑
a∈A(I′)
σi(I
′, a)RTi (I
′, a),
completing the proof.
Corollary 1.
RTi,full(I, σi) ≤ ∆i|D(I)|
√
|A(Ii)|T .
Proof. By Lemma 1,
RTi,full(I, σi) =
∑
I′∈D(I)
piσi (I, I
′)
∑
a∈A(I′)
σi(I
′, a)RTi (I
′, a)
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≤
∑
I′∈D(I)
max
a∈A(I)
RT,+i (I
′, a)
≤ |D(I)|∆i
√
|A(Ii)|T
by equation (4).
Theorem 3. Let σ1, σ2, ... be strategy profiles generated by CFR in an
extensive-form game, let I ∈ Ii, and let a be an iteratively strictly domi-
nated action at I, where removal in sequence of the iteratively strictly dom-
inated actions a1, ..., ak at I1, ..., Ik respectively yields iterative dominance of
ak+1 = a. If for 1 ≤ ` ≤ k + 1, there exist real numbers δ`, γ` > 0 and an
integer T` such that for all T ≥ T`, |Σδ`(I`) ∩ {σt | T` ≤ t ≤ T}| ≥ γ`T , then
(i) there exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, RTi (I, a) < 0,
(ii) if limT→∞ xT/T = 0, then limT→∞ yT (I, a)/T = 0, where yT (I, a) is
the number of iterations 1 ≤ t ≤ T satisfying σt(I, a) > 0, and
(iii) if limT→∞ xT/T = 0, then limT→∞ piσ¯
T
i (I)σ¯
T
i (I, a) = 0.
Proof. We will first prove parts (i) and (ii) by strong induction on k, followed
by proving (iii) from (ii). For δ ≥ 0, let Σˆδ(I) = {σ ∈ Σδ(I) | σ(I`, a`) =
0, 1 ≤ ` ≤ k} be the set of strategies in Σδ(I) that do not play a1, ..., ak. By
iterative strict domination of a, there exists σ′i ∈ Σi such that vi(I, σ(I→a)) ≤
vi(I, (σ
′
i, σ−i)) for all σ ∈ Σˆ0(I). Next, let δ = δk+1 and γ = γk+1. Then,
since Σˆδ(I) is a closed and bounded set and vi(I, ·) is continuous, by the
Balzano-Weierstrass Theorem there exists an  > 0 such that vi(I, σ(I→a)) ≤
vi(I, (σ
′
i, σ−i))−  for all σ ∈ Σˆδ(I). Then,
RTi (I, a) = R
T
i (I, a)−RTi,full(I, σ′i) +RTi,full(I, σ′i)
=
T∑
t=1
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
+RTi,full(I, σ
′
i)
=
T ′0−1∑
t=1
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
+
∑
T ′0≤t≤T
σt /∈Σˆ0(I)
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
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+
∑
T ′0≤t≤T
σt∈Σˆδ(I)
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
+
∑
T ′0≤t≤T
σt∈Σˆ0(I)\Σˆδ(I)
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
+RTi,full(I, σ
′
i).
(A.5)
For the base case k = 0, we have Σˆ0(I) = Σ and Σˆδ(I) = Σδ(I). Choose T0
to be any integer greater than max{T ′0,∆2i |D(I)|2|A(Ii)|/2γ2} so that for all
T ≥ T0,
RTi (I, a) =
T ′0−1∑
t=1
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
+
∑
T ′0≤t≤T
σt∈Σδ(I)
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
+
∑
T ′0≤t≤T
σt /∈Σδ(I)
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
+RTi,full(I, σ
′
i)
≤ −|Σδ(I) ∩ {σt | T0 ≤ t ≤ T}|+RTi,full(I, σ′i)
≤ −γT + ∆i|D(I)|
√
|A(Ii)|T by Corollary 1
< 0
by choice of T0. This establishes part (i) of the base case. For part (ii),
since CFR applies regret matching at I, by equation (5) it follows that for
all T ≥ T0, either
∑
b∈A(I) R
T,+
i (I, b) = 0 or σ
T+1
i (I, a) = 0. Thus,
lim
T→∞
yT (I, a)
T
= lim
T→∞
yT0(I, a) + (yT (I, a)− yT0(I, a))
T
≤ lim
T→∞
yT0(I, a) + xT
T
= 0.
Thus, (ii) holds and we have established the base case of our induction.
For the induction step, we now assume that parts (i) and (ii) hold for
all a1, ..., ak. We will show that there exists an integer T0 such that for all
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T ≥ T0, RTi (I, a) < 0. This will establish part (i), and part (ii) will then
follow as before to complete the induction step.
Firstly, note that∑
T ′0≤t≤T
σt∈Σˆ0(I)\Σˆδ(I)
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
) ≤ 0
by iterative domination of a. Secondly,∑
T ′0≤t≤T
σt∈Σˆδ(I)
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
≤ −|Σˆδ(I) ∩ {σt | T0 ≤ t ≤ T}|
= −
(
|Σδ(I) ∩ {σt | T0 ≤ t ≤ T}| − |(Σδ(I)\Σˆδ(I)) ∩ {σt | T0 ≤ t ≤ T}|
)
≤ −γT + 
k∑
`=1
yT (I`, a`).
Thirdly,
∑
T ′0≤t≤T
σt /∈Σˆ0(I)
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
) ≤ ∆i k∑
`=1
yT (I`, a`).
Thus, substituting these three inequalities and Corollary 1 into equation
(A.5) gives
RTi (I, a) ≤
T ′0−1∑
t=1
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
+ ∆i
k∑
`=1
yT (I`, a`)− γT + 
k∑
`=1
yT (I`, a`) + ∆i|D(I)|
√
|A(Ii)|T .
Dividing both sides by T and taking the limit superior gives
lim sup
T→∞
RTi (I, a)
T
≤
T ′0−1∑
t=1
(
vi(I, σ
t
(I→a))− vi(I, (σ′i, σt−i))
)
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
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+ (∆i + )
k∑
`=1
lim sup
T→∞
yT (I`, a`)
T
− γ + ∆i|D(I)|
√
|A(Ii)| lim sup
T→∞
1√
T
= −γ
< 0
by applying part (ii) of the induction hypothesis. Therefore, there exists an
integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, RTi (I, a)/T < 0 and thus RTi (I, a) < 0,
completing the induction step.
Parts (i) and (ii) are now proven. It remains to prove (iii). To that end,
lim
T→∞
piσ¯
T
i (I)σ¯
T
i (I, a) = lim
T→∞
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
piσ
t
i (I)
)∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (I)σ
t
i(I, a)∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (I)
= lim
T→∞
∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (I)σ
t
i(I, a)
T
≤ lim
T→∞
yT (I, a)
T
= 0
by part (ii). Since piσ¯
T
i (I)σ¯
T
i (I, a) is nonnegative, it follows that
limT→∞ piσ¯
T
i (I)σ¯
T
i (I, a) = 0, completing the proof.
Theorem 4. Let σ1, σ2, ... be strategy profiles generated by CFR in an
extensive-form game, and let σi be an iteratively strictly dominated strategy.
Then,
(i) there exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, there exist I ∈ Ii,
a ∈ A(I) such that piσi (I)σi(I, a) > 0 and RTi (I, a) < 0, and
(ii) if limT→∞ xT/T = 0, then limT→∞ yT (σi)/T = 0, where yT (σi) is the
number of iterations 1 ≤ t ≤ T satisfying supp(σi) ⊆ supp(σti).
Proof. Let s1j1 , s
2
j2
, ..., skjk be iteratively strictly dominated pure strategies
that once removed in sequence yields strict domination of σi. Let S−i =
S−i\{s1j1 , s2j2 , ..., skjk} be the set of opponent pure strategy profiles that do
not play any of s1j1 , s
2
j2
, ..., skjk . Next, by iterative strict domination of σi and
because the game is finite, there exists another strategy σ′i ∈ Σi such that
 = min
s−i∈S−i
ui(σ
′
i, s−i)− ui(σi, s−i) > 0,
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so that ui(σi, s−i) ≤ ui(σ′i, s−i)−  for all s−i ∈ S−i.
For σˆi ∈ Σi, define RTi,full(σˆi) =
∑T
t=1
(
ui(σˆi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σt)
)
. Note that
RTi,full(σˆi) =
∑
I∈Iˆi
RTi,full(I, σˆi),
where Iˆi = {I ∈ Ii | ∀h ∈ I, h′ @ h, P (h′) 6= i} is the set of all possible
first information sets for player i reached. So, by Corollary 1, RTi,full(σˆi) ≤
∆i|Ii|
√|A(Ii)|T for all σˆi ∈ Σi. Then by Lemma 1, we have∑
I∈Ii
piσi (I)
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)R
T
i (I, a)
= RTi,full(σi)−RTi,full(σ′i) +RTi,full(σ′i)
=
T∑
t=1
(
ui(σi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σ′i, σt−i)
)
+RTi,full(σ
′
i)
=
∑
supp(σt−i)⊆S−i
1≤t≤T
∑
s−i∈S−i
σt−i(s−i) (ui(σi, s−i)− ui(σ′i, s−i))
+
∑
supp(σt−i)*S−i
1≤t≤T
(
ui(σi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σ′i, σt−i)
)
+RTi,full(σ
′
i),
where σ−i(s−i) =
∏
j 6=i
I∈Ij
σj(I, sj(I))
≤ −
(
T −
k∑
`=1
yT (s`j`)
)
+ ∆i
k∑
`=1
yT (s`j`) + ∆i|Ii|
√
|A(Ii)|T . (A.6)
We claim that
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
∑
I∈Ii
piσi (I)
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)R
T
i (I, a) < 0.
Assuming the claim holds, because (1/T ), piσi (I), and σi(I, a) are nonnega-
tive, it follows that there exists an integer T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, there
exist I ∈ Ii, a ∈ A(I) such that piσi (I)σi(I, a) > 0 and RTi (I, a) < 0, estab-
lishing (i). For part (ii), note that part (i) and equation (5) imply that for
43
all T ≥ T0, either
∑
b∈A(I) R
T,+
i (I, b) = 0 or supp(σi) * supp(σTi ). Thus,
lim
T→∞
yT (σi)
T
= lim
T→∞
yT0(σi) + (y
T (σi)− yT0(σi))
T
≤ lim
T→∞
yT0(σi) + x
T
T
= 0,
establishing part (ii).
To complete the proof, it remains to prove the claim, which we will prove
by induction on k. For the base case k = 0, equation (A.6) gives
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
∑
I∈Ii
piσi (I)
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)R
T
i (I, a) ≤ lim sup
T→∞
−+ ∆i|Ii|
√|A(Ii)|√
T
= −
< 0.
For the induction step, we may assume that parts (i) and (ii) hold for all
s1j1 , s
2
j2
, ..., skjk . Then equation (A.6) implies
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
∑
I∈Ii
piσi (I)
∑
a∈A(I)
σi(I, a)R
T
i (I, a) ≤ −+ (+ ∆i)
k∑
`=1
lim sup
T→∞
yT (s`j`)
T
+ lim sup
T→∞
∆i|Ii|
√|A(Ii)|√
T
= −
< 0,
proving the claim.
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